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MINIMUM COMMISSION RATES
court's statement that the alleged negligence occurred "in the course
of use of the premises for the purpose for which it was leased." 32
This seems to indicate that the defendant would not have been
found liable had the sublessee's negligence occurred in some use of
the premises not contemplated by the parties to the sublease. Also,
there is an implication that a tenant's liability for his sublessee's
willful injury of the premises would depend upon some principle
analogous to the scope and course of employment doctrines of agency
law.33 At any rate, due to the existence of a formidable new risk
on the lessee, and the possible limitations on its application in pro-
tection of the landlord, both parties would be prudent to see that
leases made in North Carolina deal specifically with the question of
waste by the sublessee.
DAviD B. SENTELLE
Securities Regulations-An Antitrust Challenge to the Minimum
Commission Rates of the New York Stock Exchange
When the New York Stock Exchange was organized in 1792,
one of the avowed purposes of its founders was the establishment
of minimum commission rates to be charged to customers. Such
minimum commission schedules have remained in effect since that
date with only the methods of computation undergoing any altera-
tions.1
In the recent case of Kaplan v. Lehman Bros.2 an antitrust chal-
lenge was posed to these rates for the first time since their inception.
The plaintiffs, shareholders in five mutual funds, brought the ac-
tion as a shareholders derivative suit and at the same time as a
representative class action alleging that the minimum commission
rates imposed by the defendant New York Stock Exchange and
32 265 N.C. at 128, 143 S.E.2d at 284.
"See Chappell v. Dean, 258 N.C. 412, 128 S.E.2d 830 (1963); Travis
v. Duckworth, 237 N.C. 471, 75 S.E.2d 309 (1953); Marlowe v. Bland 154
N.C. 140, 69 S.E. 752 (1910).
1 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Special Study of
the Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
295-96 (1963).
2250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
'Article XV, § 2 of the constitution of the New York Stock Exchange
provides for the following minimum commissions to be charged to non-
members on round lots:
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charged by four defendant members were in violation of section one
of the Sherman Act.4 The district court granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment, holding that an antitrust action was not the
proper remedy since the fixed commission rates were subject to
regulation by the SEC.5
The court's reasoning necessarily embodied a full discussion of
the implications of Silver v. New York Stock Exch.' in which the
Supreme Court of the United States upheld an earlier antitrust suit
brought against the Exchange. In that case the court held that
where the Exchange revoked a nonmember broker-dealer's direct
wire service with member firms and with the Exchange without
giving the nonmember either reason for or notice of such revoca-
tion, the defendant Exchange was liable for a violation of sections
one and two - of the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing
for the majority, stated that anticompetitive restraints imposed by
the Exchange would clearly violate "the Sherman Act unless justi-
fied by reference to the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act,
and . . . that that statute affords no justification for anticompetitive
collective action taken without according fair procedures."" Thus,
while it is clear that the Exchange Act standing by itself does not
grant the Exchange immunity to the antitrust laws, the emphasis of
the decision in Silver was on the lack of procedural safeguards in
the area in controversy.
The court in Kaplan interpreted the Silver decision as holding
that no actions by the Exchange in restraint of competition are per
se in violation of the Sherman Act as long as it is acting pursuant to
its rule making authority.9 Therefore, since the plaintiff's based
2% on first $400 of money involved plus
1% on next $2,000 of money involved plus
1/2% on next $2,600 of money involved plus
:Ko% on money involved above $5,000
plus $3.00
Constitution of the N.Y. Stock Exch., 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GUIDE
1702.
' 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The appli-
cable part of the section is, "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. .
'250 F. Supp. at 566.
6373 U.S. 341 (1963).
"26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
8 373 U.S. at 364.
'250 F. Supp. at 564.
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their action on the per se theory, the Silver decision foreclosed any
recovery.' 0
The court further indicated that the decision would have been
the same even if the plaintiffs had not relied solely on a per se
violation theory. A major distinction between Silver and Kaplan
is that the latter case involved a situation where certain procedural
safeguards had been provided by the Exchange Act, whereas in the
former case these were lacking. Section 19(b) 1 authorizes SEC
review and regulation of thirteen enumerated matters, ninth of
which encompasses "the fixing of reasonable rates of commission,
interest, listing, and other charges."' 2 In Kaplan the court reasoned
that provision for such review remedied the situation that the Su-
preme Court complained of in Silver-the lack of procedural safe-
guards.'3
The Kaplan case illustrates a basic dilemma presented by the
clash of two conflicting policies embodied in the antitrust laws and
the Exchange Act. On the one hand the Sherman Act favors the
protection of free competition, while the Exchange Act provides for
self-regulation by the Exchange which necessarily includes the anti-
competitive effects of concerted action.'4 There is no specific ex-
emption of Exchanges to antitrust liability contained in the Ex-
change Act.'a Nor can such immunity be implied on the theory that
the passage of the Exchange Act impliedly repealed repugnant sec-
tions of the antitrust laws.' Congress worked out the statutory
20 1d. at 565.148 Stat. 898-99 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
1248 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9) (1964).
""Since review is afforded within the system of securities regulation,
there is no need to resort to the antitrust laws for a remedy." 250 F. Supp.
at 566.
1" Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrumt Laws to the Securities Field,
16 W. REs. L. Rv. 131, 134 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Nerenberg].
" In contrast, the Maloney Act, which deals with associations of over-
the-counter dealers, provides as follows: "If any provision of this section is
in conflict with any provision of any law of the United States in force on
June 25, 1938, the provision of this section shall prevail." 52 Stat. 1075(1938), 15 U.S.C. § 7 8o-3(n) (1964).
At the same time the Act authorizes the Commission to refuse registra-
tion to any association whose actions are not consistent with free and
competitive markets-the fundamental objective of the antitrust laws. 52
Stat. 1071 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (8) (1964).
1" "It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication
are not favored." Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357(1963); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). Accord,
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1932).
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scheme to regulate securities with antitrust problems in mind; they
provided no exemption from antitrust laws and it is hardly prob-
able that they inadvertently failed to do so." But Congress did
bestow a "federally mandated duty of self-policing" on the Ex-
changes.' To carry out this duty, the Exchanges must be allowed
a certain degree of control over their members. Such control neces-
sitates the imposition of uniform rules and regulations, resulting
in concerted action by the member firms."' If such concert is not
protected in some measure by the Exchange Act, an antitrust viola-
tion will result.20
In an attempt to resolve the conflict of policies, the court in
Silver seems to have decided that while the Exchange is not immune
to antitrust regulation and while actions taken pursuant to self regu-
lation are not per se violations of the Sherman Act, protection from
liability requires a showing that the action is in furtherance of the
purposes of the Exchange Act2 ' and that procedural safeguards in-
cluding review by the SEC are provided.22
As the court in Kaplan pointed out, section 19(b) of the Ex-
change Act provides a procedural remedy by subjecting the mini-
mum commission rates to review by the SEC.-3 But this remedy
has been virtually ignored; in the entire history of the statute only
one formal proceeding involving this section has been brought.
2 4
Subsection nine was not involved in that action' and it appears that
there have been few, if any, complaints of the commissions charged.
As an additional safeguard, section 25(a) of the Exchange Act
provides for review of SEC decisions by the Court of Appeals of
" United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).1 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963).
" Proposed Legislation-Antitrust Laws Immunity, 3 CCH N.Y. STOCx
Excir. GUIDE 7 5212.
Nerenberg 134.
"The principal purposes of the Exchange Act are "to insure fair dealing
and to protect investors." 48 Stat. 886 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1964).
"373 U.S. at 364.
"48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
"42 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1182 (2d ed. 1961).
"
8 The New York Stock Exchange had passed a rule subjecting members
to expulsion or suspension for "multiple trading," i.e., for trading in Ex-
change listed stocks on other exchanges for the member's own account. The
Commission ruled that certain changes would have to be made in the rule
to prevent a violation of a basic purpose of the Act-"a purpose which is
closely related to the public policy regarding unreasonable restraints and
the maintenance of fair competition .... " Rules of the New York Stock
Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270, 287 (1941).
[Vol. 45
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the circuit in which the aggrieved party has his residence or his
principal place of business. 26
The court in Kaplan neglected to discuss the other requirement
enumerated by Silver for protection from antitrust liability-that
the concerted action be in pursuance of the purposes of the Exchange
Act. It would appear that the setting of such minimum rates, which
in reality act as fixed rates, would serve to protect investors in that
both small and large investors are charged the same rates. In the
absence of such fixed minimums, the charge to the small investor in
relation to the large investor might become disproportionately in-
creased so that the small buyer would be effectively pushed out of
the market. Another advantage of minimum commission rates is
that they facilitate an audit of a member's income and thereby in-
crease the effectiveness of control exercised by the commission.
Furthermore, while minimum rates reduce price competition among
members, they serve to increase competition "in ancillary services
such as furnishing research, investment advice and quotations, safe-
keeping of securities, and collecting dividends."27
However, there are persuasive arguments in favor of subject-
ing the minimum commission rates to antitrust regulation. In
United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards"' the Court
held that an agreement among members of a real estate board to
maintain standard rates was per se a violation of the Sherman Act.
The Court declared that, "an agreement, shown either by adherence
to a price schedule or by proof of consensual action fixing the uni-
form or minimum price, is itself illegal under the Sherman Act, no
matter what end it was designed to serve."29 Certainly, the Kaplan
situation can be distinguished on the basis that the defendants there
were subject to the Exchange Act. Since the Silver case seemingly
indicates that an Exchange or Exchange member that is subject to
26 48 Stat. 901-02 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1964). In order
for a decision of the SEC to be reviewable under § 25(a) the Commission's
action must be in the form of a final order. SEC v. Andrews, 88 F.2d 441(2d Cir. 1937).
2 Nerenberg 149.
S339 U.S. 485 (1950).
" Id. at 489; Accord, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940). But cf., Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918). "The true test of legality [of a restraint of trade] is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion."
1966]
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the Exchange Act is not liable per se for an antitrust violation,30
it would appear that the distinction is valid. Nevertheless, Silver did
not deal with minimum commission rates and its broad language
might not be sufficient to protect the Exchange in the face of the
strong declaration of antitrust policy by the court in Real Estate
Boards.1 It is submitted that the Court may require a stronger
justification for the minimum rates before it follows the district
court decision.
The argument that minimum rates -increase competition in an-
cillary services might appear at first blush to justify the commission
schedule. However, since the more costly special services such as
direct wires and elaborate analytical and statistical information 2 are
normally offered only to large customers, the commission rates have
the effect of causing many small investors to pay for services not
rendered to them. Furthermore, the small investor cannot remedy
his plight by taking his business elsewhere since the charges must
necessarily remain the same.33
The application of minimum commission rates to nonmember
broker-dealers may have an even greater damaging effect upon com-
petition. A nonmember broker-dealer pays the same commission
rate to a member firm for listed securities that his customer would
pay had he originally placed his order with the member. The non-
member is unable to charge his customer a rate in excess of the
minimum because the competition of the member firms would draw
the customer away. The result of such a transaction is that the
nonmember receives a commission exactly equal to the one he paid
to a member firm.3 4 Thus, he not only fails to make a profit on the
transaction, but he also has no margin to cover basic operating ex-
penses. Moreover, if he refuses to handle such a transaction, he is
liable to lose his customer's business altogether.3 5
It appears that justification for minimum commission rates set
30 373 U.S. at 348.
"339 U.S. 485 (1950).
2 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Special Study of
the Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
312 (1963).
"_Nerenberg 149.
"Furthermore, the constitution of the Exchange prohibits rebates to or
fee splitting with nonmembers. Constitution of the N.Y. Stock Exch., 2
CCH N.Y. STOcK ExcH. GUIDE 1708.
" Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Special Study of
the Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
312 (1963).
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by the New York Exchange is at best open to question. The right
to have such rates reviewed by the SEC is in reality illusory since
that review is of the reasonableness of the commissions and pre-
supposes a fixed minimum. It is not the reasonableness that should
be questioned but rather the very existence of minimums imposed
by an exchange upon its members. Mr. Nerenberg36 suggests that
strictly as a matter of antitrust law, the existence of so important
and pervasive a structure of commission rates ought to rest on a
sounder legal foundation. If there is sufficient economic justifica-
tion to insist upon a minimum rate structure, then classification
by way of a limited antitrust exemption by statute would be
appropriate. Otherwise, in the absence of further regulatory con-
trol by the Commission, it would appear that the present rate
structure may be susceptible to antitrust enforcement.8 7
The Chairman of the SEC, Mr. Cohen, also suggests that legis-
lation should be passed to resolve sensitive and complex questions
"to correct any failure to afford proper weight to antitrust poli-
cies." ' Cohen further believes that Congress should pass legisla-
tion similar to the Maloney Act3 9 that would apply to exchange
markets. Such legislation should incorporate standards relating to
the antitrust field; once such standards are included, Congress
should exempt the Exchange and its members from antitrust liabil-
ity for actions that conform with the Act.40
If Congress does not act there may well be a number of other
antitrust challenges to the actions of the Exchange. Some of the
likely areas of dispute are as follows:
1. Exchange Rule 39441 that prohibits Exchange members from
trading listed securities in the over-the-counter market with-
out special permission from the Exchange.
2. Prohibition of fee splitting;42 i.e., splitting a commission with
a nonmember broker-dealer.
Mr. Nerenberg is an attorney with the Office of the General Counsel
for the SEC.
"' Nerenberg 151.
"Proposed Legislation-Antitrust Laws Immunity, 3 CCH N.Y. STOCK
Excnr. GUIDE 5238.
"' See note 15 supra.
,0 Nerenberg 151.
"' Off-Floor Transactions in Listed Stocks, 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH.
GUIDE 2394.
'* Nerenberg 149.
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3. "Allegedly restrictive policies governing admission to mem-
bership," specifically, the exclusion of mutual funds.43
While this is by no means an exhaustive list of problem areas, it
should serve to emphasize Mr. Cohen's point that congressional ac-
tion is needed to achieve a balance between the antitrust policy of
insuring free and unrestrained competition and the Exchange Act
policy of self-regulation.
CHARLES E. ELROD, JR.
Taxation-Effect of State Court Adjudications in Federal
Tax Litigation
From at least as early as the Supreme Court decision in Freuler
v. Helvering' there has been great uncertainty and even conflict
among the lower federal courts as to the extent to which those
courts, when making determinations of federal tax liability, should
be bound by lower state court adjudications of property rights. In
Freuler the Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued that any state
property decision reached in a collusive proceeding be denied con-
clusiveness in regard to federal tax liability. The Commissioner
defined a collusive proceeding as one in which "all the parties joined
in a submission of the issues and sought a decision which would
adversely affect the Government's right to additional ... tax."'2 The
Court neither accepted nor rejected the Commissioner's proposed
test for collusiveness and decided for the taxpayer by upholding
the state decision because of the presence of certain circumstances
which the Court apparently deemed to be controlling.3 By basing its
decision on those circumstances, the Court gave little guidance to
lower courts in the way of general principles to be followed, and its
"' Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1965, p. 3, col. 1.
1291 U.S. 35 (1934).
'Id. at 45.
The circumstances were that the case appears to have been initiated
by the filing of a trustee's account, in the usual way. Notice was given
to the interested parties. Objections to the account were presented,
and the matter came on for hearing in due course, all parties being
represented by counsel. The decree purports to decide issues regularly
submitted and not to be in any sense a consent decree.
Id. at 45.
[Vol. 45
